


## Part 4



# Reform of the UN System

---

## Administrative and Management Reform

After the release of the Secretary-General's new round of reform proposals in fall 2002, the United States actively engaged the UN Secretariat and other member states to ensure that these administrative and management reforms would result in a more efficient and effective UN system.

The Secretary-General signaled his continuing commitment to improvement in the UN by issuing a new round (Track III) of reform proposals with 36 action items. On December 20, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 57/300 by consensus, allowing the Secretary-General to implement most of his initiatives and requesting additional information regarding the others.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that the overarching theme of these proposals would be "doing what matters" most to member states. In this light, he indicated that the UN's program of work, Medium-Term Plan, and budget would reflect the Millennium Development Goals as agreed upon by the member states. He sought to immediately implement those reforms that he could as chief administrative officer of the United Nations and to obtain UN General Assembly approval of the other action items that had budgetary implications.

The reform proposals included a major review of the Department of Public Information, as well as the creation of regional information hub centers to improve the flow of information and achieve efficiency savings, such as by consolidating some offices. The Secretary-General also committed to implementing better evaluations of programs; establishing a more efficient, streamlined budget and programming process; and instituting management improvements to improve policy planning in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, strengthening management in the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and facilitating earlier planning in the Department of General Assembly and Conference Management.

The Secretary-General's reform proposal identified major improvements in the planning and servicing of meetings (including increased use of information technology); ways to reinforce coordination among UN

entities, such as through joint programming and integrated resources mobilization in field coordination; ways to streamline and strengthen the interaction between the United Nations and civil society based on a high-level panel's recommendations; and methods that would improve the quality and performance of staff (such as by implementing flexible work hours and encouraging mobility).

Although the United States supported the resolution giving the Secretary-General the authorization to pursue this newest set of management reforms, it believed close monitoring would be needed to ensure the reforms were implemented in a cost-effective manner.

## **Peacekeeping Reform**

Implementation of peacekeeping reform measures continued in 2002. With staffing shortages in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) having been addressed and largely corrected during the previous two years, member states focused their attention on the problem of slow deployment times caused by procurement delays. To meet deployment goals of 30 days for a traditional mission and 90 days for a complex mission, as suggested by the Panel on UN Peace Operations in 2000 and subsequently endorsed by the Secretary-General and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 56/292 on July 18, 2002. This resolution authorized funds in the amount of \$141.5 million for the establishment of Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy. The Secretariat's original proposal for the SDS had included enough equipment to outfit both a large, complex mission of approximately 10,000 troops, and a smaller, traditional mission of up to 5,000 troops. The United States recommended and found support for a more realistic proposal that authorized funding for only the large mission, until the concept proved effective. In its report, the Special Committee expressed the view that the SDS should be ready to support one complex mission by early 2003, with the possibility of expanding this capacity to include the smaller, traditional mission at a later date.

Another issue addressed by the Special Committee was the methodology for reimbursing troop-contributing countries. Major troop contributors had been urging adoption of higher reimbursement rates and accelerated payments, with some calling for advance payment before deployment. The United States was successful in postponing consideration of this matter pending a review and development of new proposed reimbursement formulas by the Secretariat. The review was still in progress at the end of the year and the Special Committee anticipated further discussion of the issue at the second resumed session of the 57th General Assembly in May 2003.

The General Assembly approved two key additional new posts for the DPKO in Resolution 56/293 on July 30, 2002. These were for a Director

of Change Management (D-2), and a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Adviser (P-4). The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions had recommended approval of these new posts in 2001, but the Fifth Committee had deferred consideration until 2002. The United States supported these proposed new posts based on the findings of a comprehensive review conducted in 2001.

The Security Council continued efforts to improve dialogue and strengthen the three-way relationship among the Council, troop-contributing countries (TCC), and the Secretariat. At the urging of TCCs not completely satisfied with meetings and briefings conducted under the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1353 (2001), the President of the Council issued a note in January 2002 establishing a new mechanism for consultations with major troop contributors (those countries contributing at least a unit). This group had acknowledged the improvements of Resolution 1353, but felt it did not go far enough in providing a forum for informal and interactive dialogue. The United States initially opposed the establishment of another forum for consultations out of concern that additional meetings might impede the work of the Council, but eventually agreed to the new mechanism. Under this new format, the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping would conduct joint meetings with TCCs and the Secretariat. This mechanism was used in August to brief major TCCs on Sierra Leone. Participants expressed satisfaction with the briefing.

At year's end, recruiting for 184 new posts authorized for DPKO in 2000 and 2001 was 98 percent complete with 180 filled. Of four new posts authorized for DPKO in 2002, all were filled. Of 39 peacekeeping-related posts approved for other UN departments in 2000 and 2001, recruiting was 95 percent complete with 37 positions filled. Efforts continued to recruit qualified personnel for all remaining vacant posts. As a result of the new posts approved since 2000, DPKO had reached an authorized staffing level of 577.

## **Security Council Reform**

For the ninth year in a row, a meeting took place of the General Assembly's "Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of the Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council." Once again, its members (with membership open to all UN members) failed to arrive at any consensus on the issues of Security Council expansion or changes to the Council's working methods. The Working Group was to continue deliberations in 2003.

The 57th General Assembly discussed the question of Security Council reform in an October plenary meeting. During that debate, the United States stressed that Security Council reform should be a means to enable the Council to better exercise its primary responsibility under the UN

*United States Participation in the United Nations – 2002*

Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. The United States also stated that the Council's ultimate size and composition must be considered at the same time. Finally, the United States made clear that it would continue to oppose efforts to limit or eliminate the veto.